Moe, Aaron M., Zoopoetics: Animals and the Making of Poetry by Gannon, Thomas C.
Volume 32 
Number 1 ( 2014) 
Special Double Issue: Whitman and the Civil 
War 
pps. 91-95 
Moe, Aaron M., Zoopoetics: Animals and the Making of Poetry 
Thomas C. Gannon 
ISSN 0737-0679 (Print) 
ISSN 2153-3695 (Online) 
Copyright © 2014 Thomas C. Gannon 
Recommended Citation 
Gannon, Thomas C. "Moe, Aaron M., Zoopoetics: Animals and the Making of Poetry." Walt 
Whitman Quarterly Review 32 (2014), 91-95. https://doi.org/10.13008/0737-0679.2141 
This Review is brought to you for free and open access by Iowa Research Online. It has been accepted for inclusion 
in Walt Whitman Quarterly Review by an authorized administrator of Iowa Research Online. For more information, 
please contact lib-ir@uiowa.edu. 
91
The reality, the simplicity, the transparency of my dear, dear mother’s life, was re-
sponsible for the main things in the letters as in Leaves of Grass itself.  How much I 
owe her!  It could not be put in a scale—weighed: it could not be measured—be even 
put in the best words: it can only be apprehended through the intuitions.  Leaves of 
Grass is the flower of her temperament active in me.  My mother was illiterate in the 
formal sense but strangely knowing: she excelled in narrative—had great mimetic 
powers: she could tell stories, impersonate: she was very eloquent in the utterance of 
noble moral axioms, she was very original in her manner, her style.
Wesley Raabe’s edition of Louisa’s letters demonstrates just how right Whit-
man was in his assessment.
Brooklyn, New York            ShErry cEniza
aaron M. MoE, Zoopoetics: Animals and the Making of Poetry. Lanham, MD: 
Lexington Books, 2014. x + 159 pp.
The following Thoreauvian questions have been fundamental to literary eco-
criticism: can humans speak for “Nature”? If so, who, and how? In his Zoopoet-
ics: Animals and the Making of Poetry, Aaron M. Moe answers, yes, some human 
poets (including Walt Whitman) can, and they do—first, by paying attention 
to the behaviors of other animals, and then by translating this alter-species 
semiotics into human discourse. In the poetry of Whitman, E. E. Cummings, 
W. S. Merwin, and Brenda Hillman, Moe “explore[s] how an attentiveness to 
animals contributes to each poet’s makings” (22). Moe’s insistence, moreover, 
upon an integral relationship between other-species behavior and human poetic 
form in these poets renders his contribution to ecocriticism more ambitious 
than, say, M. Jimmie Killingsworth’s 2004 study on Whitman’s ecopoetics, 
Walt Whitman and the Earth, in which it is shown that the poet’s tropes often 
reveal a vital connection with the biosphere. For Moe, human poetry is not a 
“monospecies event,” but a “multispecies” one (24); and so “zoopoetics” as 
critical practice involves “discovering innovative breakthroughs in [poetic] 
form through an attentiveness to another species’ bodily poiesis” (10). This is 
Moe’s favorite sentence, since he uses some form of it several times a chapter 
in describing poems by his four poets. This repetition becomes problematic, 
however, as the reader eventually wonders if every poem discussed is truly 
some “innovative breakthrough” in form issuing immediately from observ-
ing another animal’s semiotics, if such empirical “attentiveness” actually is a 
sine qua non for eco-mindful poetry, and if “bodily poiesis” is more than just a 
dangerously anthropomorphic metaphor in such a critical context.
Moe finds a “commonality” and “continuity” in the “universal rhetoric” 
of the material body, in the “primacy” of gesture itself (9, 16, 12); a priori to 
human words is a “poiesis shared by many animals” (17). This leads directly to 
Walt Whitman, since discussion of “the poetics of the human body,” as Moe 
admits, “retrace[s] well-trodden steps in Whitman scholarship” (38). But this 
move also entails too broad of a conflation of two related but separate points 
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regarding “body rhetoric”: 1) the centrality of the material (human) body to 
human language and discourse—now a critical commonplace in contemporary 
theories of poetics; and 2) the importance of other animals’ gesturing bod-
ies to human poetic form (Moe’s zoopoetics), at least in the work of certain 
“attentive” poets. The Whitman chapter elides the two in key places, as if 
asserting the first point firmly demonstrates the second, the latter a much 
tougher tenet to support.
That said, Moe’s turn to Kristeva’s sémiotique is perhaps his best, most in-
genious attempt, via theory, to bridge the species gap, in a common human/
non-human “‘preverbal semiotic space’” (35). In Whitman’s “words that 
print cannot touch,” he “pushes words back” to the “pre-linguistic energy of” 
Kristeva’s “semiotic chora” (40)—and the (animal) body. Whitman’s “origin 
of all poems” thus necessarily incorporates “the bodily poetics of other spe-
cies,” via “a deep universal poetics” (37, 41), and the poet’s proto-Darwinian 
“same old law” becomes “the same old law of bodily poiesis.” (All italics are 
Moe’s.) The critic’s task is simply to “expose places where the gestures of many 
animals still endure within his lines” (26). Moe’s main extended readings of 
Whitman—of the spider and the eagle—are ambitious but problematic in this 
regard, and demonstrate the main difficulty with Moe’s general argument 
and his specific attempt to “see Whitman as a proto-posthumanist” who “cel-
ebrated the continuity” between species (48, 49). Speaking of an essay of mine 
(2007), Moe writes that I also have explored Whitman’s “animals,” but that 
I doubt that “Whitman ever actually gets beyond his own” anthropocentrism 
“in his adoption of another animal’s ‘barbaric yawp.’” “Gannon sees animals 
functioning merely as tropes and does not suspect Whitman is concerned with 
the actual animals of the earth” (38). But of course I am aware that Whitman 
was abundantly “concerned with” other animals—and I even amply praise his 
bird descriptions in the essay Moe discusses; but this concern and attention 
hardly means that Whitman thereby necessarily “got beyond” his inveterate 
Romantic-Egoist anthropocentrism. I might even extend my original argument 
in claiming that Moe himself never gets beyond anthropomorphism, either, in 
his drive to “translate” other species into human language. And our disagree-
ment here exemplifies the book’s main problem again: despite his several ap-
peals to Derrida and company, Moe often makes a too-easy anthropomorphic 
leap in praising his poets’ ability to “speak through other species.” As a case in 
point, Emily Dickinson’s use of the word “Whippowil” is not only an “innova-
tive moment” in verse, according to Moe, but “the bird’s song quite literally 
bursts into human language every time someone utters ‘whippoorwill’” (10). 
Literally? I don’t think so: anyone who has listened closely to this bird calling 
realizes that “whip-poor-will” is a pretty shoddy (and maybe even sadistic) 
attempt at verbal mimesis.
During his cross-species reading of “The Dalliance of Eagles,” Moe says 
that “some may cry ‘anthropomorphism’” (50). And I do, despite Moe’s de-
voting some time claiming to have carefully avoided its excesses, with such 
qualifiers as “guarded” and “critical” (48, 18). He is commonly asked, “‘aren’t 
you anthropomorphizing here?’” (47): I think he is, almost inevitably, as soon 
as he—and his chosen poets—“translate” other species into human language. 
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(His rather stunning admission that the phrase “bodily poiesis” is an intentional 
anthropomorphism [18] is not unproblematic.) Again: “One cannot say the 
tiger murdered the man [. . .] for ‘murder’ is a term too” defined by human 
standards (48). But should one then be allowed to speak of an eagle’s “poiesis” 
and its integral connection to Whitman’s lines on a page? Moe continues: “I 
contend that the poets explored here do not project agency upon the animals 
that they attentively engaged” (21). And yet it may be the height of anthropo-
centric projection to read Whitman’s eagles’ dalliance as Whitman and Moe 
and many Whitman scholars have, if a recent ornithological study is correct 
and (most) such aquiline “dalliances” may not even be courtship rituals, and 
are also performed by same-gender pairs and non-breeding immature birds 
(R. E. Simmons & J. M. Mendelsohn, “A critical review of cartwheeling 
flights of raptors,” 1993). As for Moe’s specific reading, they are certainly not 
engaged in the act of mating per se, as he seems to imply, with the mention of 
“love-making” and its “post-spasm” denouement (50-51).
More à propos of Moe’s very definition of zoopoetics, he also strongly im-
plies that Whitman invested some personal “attentiveness” to this particular 
eagle behavior (38, 52). Most explicitly: “Whitman attentively engaged the 
poiesis of many species—including [. . .] eagles”; moreover, the “Dalliance” 
poem “would not exist if Whitman did not attentively observe and study such 
animals” (52). Perhaps the connection is somewhat coyly expressed because 
Moe is aware that Whitman never witnessed such eagle behavior in person, but 
based the poem rather on a description by his birder friend William Burroughs. 
Likewise, Moe’s reading of “A Noiseless, Patient Spider” is by and large another 
excellent example of his formalist reading skills (45-46), until at last, “[t]he 
audio/visual/bodily/spatial/temporal iconicity allows the reader to experience 
vestiges of the poiesis of the spider Whitman attentively engaged” (46). But 
he must then acknowledge in a note the influence of Whitman’s reading on 
his spider discourse—i.e., Jonathan Edwards’ “essay on flying spiders” (54). 
One begins to wonder, after reading so many of Moe’s examples of zoopoet-
ics in action, whether one is supposed to be able to tell from the poem alone 
whether the poet has actually been personally “attentive” or not to another 
species in fashioning the poem. (In fact, Moe often makes this assumption of 
“attentiveness” without biographical evidence.) So does Whitman’s fictitious 
(second-hand) “attentiveness” to dallying eagles (and maybe, thread-tossing 
spiders) render such poems de facto less powerful in their eco-consciousness? 
Can “attending” to other species on the Discovery Channel be just as poeti-
cally efficacious? Etc., etc.: the questions begin to multiply almost infinitely.
Many of Moe’s specific readings are wonderful, the analyses impressing with 
their great attention to prosodic detail, from stanza form and shape down to 
the minutest caesura. The Cummings chapter includes some of Moe’s most 
ingenious formalist readings, due in part, no doubt, to Cummings’ own great 
experimentation in form. In fact, the reader may wonder whether it is more this 
experimentalism that allows for Moe’s marvelous readings than Cummings’ 
supposed “attentiveness” to other animals “making poiesis.” Moe’s own great 
attentiveness to Cummings’ “(im)c-a-t(mo)” (73-77) results in one of his most 
convincing formalist readings. In contrast to Whitman’s eagles, one can read-
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ily agree with Moe that Cummings has indeed “attentively marveled at the 
well-timed acrobatics of an actual cat” (76). His takes on several Cummings 
“thrush” poems are also well done: regarding the poem “rainsweet,” Moe 
even breaks out a stopwatch to a Cornell Lab of Ornithology recording of the 
hermit thrush in a bold attempt to clarify the poem’s timing and pauses (71). 
Very nice. But I am reminded of the quite subjective nature of the zoopoetic 
enterprise when Cummings’ line “t,h;r:u;s,h;e:s” is read by Moe as follows: 
the thrushes “begin with singing, proceed to silence, but return to singing, 
proceed to silence,” etc. (72). In contrast, I would more simply read the line 
as a single instance of a thrush’s trilling, echoing song. Then—in Cummings’ 
“in front of your house I”—to read the spare abstraction of a “green bird 
perched carefully upon / a gesture” as a “multispecies event” (67), based upon 
a zoopoetics of close attentiveness to an actual bird, is truly a reach. And in 
another Cummings poem, “The speaker [. . .] identifies a [hummingbird’s] 
‘hi’” that is “perhaps directed toward him” (69). This isn’t anthropomorphism?
Even among twentieth-century Euro-American poets, it still seems coun-
ter-intuitive that Cummings was more attentive to other animals than, say, 
Robinson Jeffers or Gary Snyder, or—W. S. Merwin. But Merwin, at least, 
gets his own chapter, and it is, to my mind, the book’s strongest. But is this 
impression mainly because this poet has such an explicit pro-“animal” agenda 
that the zoopoetic readings naturally seem less of a leap? Whatever the case, 
these are (excerpts of) poems that an eco-scholar loves reading, rendering the 
chapter a great pleasure. A fine example of Moe’s successes occurs with this 
short Merwin poem (quoted entire): “Rain on the tin roof / lizard hands on 
the tin ceiling / listening”: “The poem directs the attention to a listening not 
through the ears, but through the haptic vibrations felt through the hands”—
via Merwin’s “attentiveness to the lizard’s way-of-being” (104). But Merwin’s 
attentiveness most often regards “the growing absence of animals” (27); in an 
era of species extinction, “when Merwin turns toward animals, they are often 
not there” (96). This leads to such strange expressions as “an attentiveness 
toward absence” (99), and Moe himself admits, “Animals no longer nurture 
Merwin’s voice like they did for Whitman, and it is very difficult for the body 
of an animal to appear in a poem if that animal does not exist” (97). This is 
an important and sad observation, but also a confusing one; certainly a poet’s 
“attentiveness toward absence” is on a different epistemological plane than 
Moe’s original intent regarding an observational attention to other species.
Brenda Hillman is another “eco-poet” whose “political” stance is even 
clearer, according to Moe. Hillman’s earthworms of her “Ballad at the State 
Capitol” who metaphorically speak truth to power via their very body shapes 
are, of course, read by Moe as another “bodily poiesis,” as another species 
“protest[ing] through the presence of their bodies” (125, 138). This reader, by 
this time, wants to protest: sometimes powerful metaphors are just that—pow-
erful metaphors. But the extended reading of Hillman’s “Rhopalic Aubade” 
is truly one of the best in the book, “as the form of the poem is shaped by an 
attentiveness to the ways blackbirds fly through the air, fly through language, 
and therefore fly through culture” (128-129)! Moe concludes his reading of 
this poem thus: “as the blackbird contributes to the rarified and intimate 
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sphere of lovers, the birds further enrich human existence one syllable at a 
time” (130). Wonderful. But Moe’s several allusions to Stevens’ blackbird 
poem (129, 130) obfuscate by conflating Hillman’s European blackbird—a 
thrush—with Wallace Stevens’ American icterid. A true attentiveness to other 
species might keep clear the (quite great) difference, especially given the im-
portance of the bird’s vocal abilities in the poem, since the “attentive” reader 
may well wonder whether a Connecticut grackle’s squawking is supposed to 
be part of the musical “enrichment” going on here.
The reverse side of zoopoetics is that other animals are also “makers,” 
which Moe claims as a veritable “expansion of the poetic tradition” (21). This 
is performed in the book in a Prelude, the Interludes between chapters, and 
a Postlude, which make up the most effective (even moving) parts of Moe’s 
support, since they concern actual non-humans practicing “poiesis” rather 
than human poets ingeniously translating other species’ “poiesis” into poetic 
form. But anthropomorphism seeps in even here, as when a beluga whale 
imitating a human word is likened to a human “poet who discovers new 
forms of poetry” (92). The reader’s agreement with Moe’s central tenet, of 
a common multispecies poiesis, really depends on how alike he/she perceives 
these two ostensibly different classes of behaviors to be. There is also a touch-
ing interlude on elephants and their “mourning rituals” (117-118). But the 
particularly moving moment when one elephant runs its trunk along a long-
deceased ancestor’s skull is, I think, heavily anthropomorphized, though Moe 
denies it: this “could be a gesture toward the poetic tradition of elegy”?! “It 
suggests (and I do not think this is anthropomorphizing) [. . .] a desire to say 
hello, and an existential[?!] grappling with the absence of” the deceased (118). 
Finally—and again—the Postlude on “Owls” makes for a fittingly emotional 
coda, as Moe encounters a dead owl and his/her mourning mate in the road. 
But anthropomorphism again must have its outlet: if Derrida “recognizes how 
extremely difficult it is for a human to glimpse the interiority, or abyss, of an 
animal,” Moe still “can speculate” that “the perched owl’s motionless poise 
[sic; pose?] exemplifies a bodily poiesis that is utterly stoic” (145). I would as-
sert that one can empathetically imagine it, but not really cogently argue for it, 
given the owl’s utterly alien semiotics and worldview. As admirable as the goal 
of Moe and others is, of bridging the species gap, acknowledging the reality of 
that barrier may often be the best way of giving other animals their true due.
If it appears that I have been over-critical of this book to the point of lengthy 
quibbling, it is because I have read it closely, applauding all along (for the most 
part) its contribution to the vital conjunction of literary studies and other 
animals that is so close to my own heart. And so I would end with a bravo, for 
a book that does indeed “help address the crime of humanity [. . .] of failing 
to recognize the ways that [other] animals are rhetorical, cultural, and poetic 
beings” (139). Above all, Moe’s selection of poets and specific readings do 
“cultivate an imagination that sees animals as much more than a ‘nicety’ or 
a ‘metaphorical convenience’ in the [Euro-American] poetic tradition and in 
human culture” (140). Even in the twenty-first century, most books of literary 
studies do far less than that. And that is a crime.
University of Nebraska-Lincoln               thoMaS c. Gannon
